Skip to main content

GitHub Actions: from build to verified release

This tutorial walks through a full attested CI pipeline using aflock-ai/cilock-action, five steps (lint, SAST, test, build, docker-build) each producing signed in-toto attestations via OIDC. The pattern below is taken directly from Cole's reference implementation at github.com/testifysec/dropbox-clone.

What you'll build

A pipeline where every step is wrapped by cilock-action and produces a signed attestation. All signing is keyless (Fulcio + GitHub OIDC), all attestations are timestamped (Sigstore TSA), and all evidence is uploaded to Archivista using OIDC for auth, no static API keys.

Prerequisites

  • A GitHub repo (this tutorial assumes a Go project, but any language works)
  • Permission to add workflow files
  • Optional: an Archivista instance + Fulcio reachable (the cilock-action defaults derive from platform-url)

Step 1: Set the right permissions

Cilock-action needs id-token: write to request the OIDC token used by Fulcio (signing) and Archivista (upload). It needs contents: read for checkout. Nothing else.

permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read

This is the same minimum set Cole uses in cilock-action-oidc.yaml.

Step 2: The five-step attested pipeline

name: cilock-action OIDC attestations

on:
workflow_dispatch:
push:
branches: [main]

permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read

env:
STAGING_URL: https://platform.aws-sandbox-staging.testifysec.dev

jobs:
attest:
name: Attested CI Pipeline
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4

- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: "1.24"

- name: Install syft
run: curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/syft/main/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin

- name: Install gosec
run: go install github.com/securego/gosec/v2/cmd/gosec@latest

# 1. Lint + secret scan
- name: lint + secrets
uses: aflock-ai/cilock-[email protected]
with:
step: lint
command: echo "lint passed"
attestations: environment git github secretscan
platform-url: ${{ env.STAGING_URL }}

# 2. SAST: gosec writes SARIF, captured as a product. -no-fail keeps
# cilock's command-run attestor green when gosec reports findings;
# the policy gate is the Rego over the captured SARIF, not the
# tool's exit code.
- name: sast
uses: aflock-ai/cilock-[email protected]
with:
step: sast
command: gosec -no-fail -fmt=sarif -out=gosec-results.sarif ./...
attestations: environment git github sarif
platform-url: ${{ env.STAGING_URL }}
cilock-args: --attestor-product-include-glob "*.sarif"

# 3. Tests
- name: test
uses: aflock-ai/cilock-[email protected]
with:
step: test
command: go test -count=1 ./...
attestations: environment git github
platform-url: ${{ env.STAGING_URL }}

# 4. Build the binary — cilock observes the compiler's exact argv
# via command-run; bin/myapp lands in product/v0.3 as a Merkle
# leaf. This is the artifact the SBOM step (next) will scan.
- name: build
uses: aflock-ai/cilock-[email protected]
env:
CGO_ENABLED: "0"
with:
step: build
command: go build -o bin/myapp ./cmd/myapp
attestations: environment git github
platform-url: ${{ env.STAGING_URL }}
cilock-args: --attestor-product-include-glob "bin/*"

# 5. SBOM the build's output — separate cilock step so syft's argv
# is its own command-run, the build artifact is recorded as
# material/v0.3 (because cilock hashes the working tree before
# syft runs), and the SBOM lands in product/v0.3. The release-
# gate Rego in step 7 verifies the SBOM's targeted file digest
# matches the build step's product.
- name: sbom
uses: aflock-ai/cilock-[email protected]
with:
step: sbom
command: syft bin/myapp -o cyclonedx-json=bin/bom.cdx.json
attestations: environment git github sbom
platform-url: ${{ env.STAGING_URL }}
cilock-args: --attestor-product-include-glob "bin/*"

# 5. Container build
- name: docker-build
uses: aflock-ai/cilock-[email protected]
with:
step: docker-build
command: docker buildx build --metadata-file docker-metadata.json -t myapp:test --load .
attestations: environment git github docker
platform-url: ${{ env.STAGING_URL }}
cilock-args: --attestor-product-include-glob "docker-metadata.json"

Why each step uses the attestor mix it does

StepExtra attestorWhy
lintsecretscanCheap to run on a no-op command, catches credentials accidentally echoed during real lint output.
sastsarifThe output is a SARIF file; the SARIF attestor parses it into structured findings inside the attestation.
test(none)Test runs primarily need command-run + git + CI context.
buildsbomBuild produces the binary that's also the SBOM target, one CI/lock invocation captures both.
docker-builddockerThe docker attestor parses the buildx metadata file and records image digests.

environment, git, and github are passed to every step, this gives you the source commit, runner identity, and CI context on every attestation, so verification policy can match identity claims per step.

What gets produced

Each step produces a signed DSSE envelope containing an in-toto Collection. With enable-archivista: true (the cilock-action default), each envelope is also pushed to Archivista using a fresh OIDC token. The attestation_file and git_oid action outputs let downstream steps reference the evidence:

- name: docker-build
id: docker
uses: aflock-ai/cilock-[email protected]
with:
step: docker-build
# ...

- name: Print evidence GitOID
run: echo "Evidence stored at ${{ steps.docker.outputs.git_oid }}"

Adding a verification gate

To make this enforce policy (not just observe), add a separate job that runs cilock verify against a signed policy after all attested steps complete. See Verify in a release gate for the gate pattern.

Going further

  • Need the raw CLI? Cole's test-staging-cilock.yaml shows the same five-step pipeline using cilock run directly instead of the action, useful for understanding what the action does under the hood.
  • Two-pipeline architecture. The repo also splits CI (ci.yaml, PR-triggered, contents: read) from CD (deploy.yaml, push-triggered, full AWS credentials via OIDC federation). This is the "two pipelines, two trust boundaries" pattern; CI/lock is the proof that the boundary holds.
  • Defending against real attacks. See Defending against supply-chain attacks for how the layers above stop the Trivy and LiteLLM compromises.